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Abstract
Recently, information-theoretic private information retrieval (PIR) from coded storage systems has gained a lot of attention, and
a general star product PIR scheme was proposed. In this paper, the star product scheme is adopted, with appropriate modifications,
to the case of private (e.g., video) streaming. It is assumed that the files to be streamed are stored on n servers in a coded form,
and the streaming is carried out via a convolutional code. The star product scheme is defined for this special case, and various
properties are analyzed for two channel models related to straggling and byzantine servers, both in the baseline case as well as
with colluding servers. The achieved PIR rates for the given models are derived and for the first model shown to be asymptotically
optimal, when the number of stripes in a file is large. The second scheme introduced in this work is shown to be the equivalent
of block convolutional codes in the PIR setting. For the Byzantine server model, it is shown to outperform the trivial scheme of
downloading stripes of the desired file separately without memory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) studies the problem when a user wants to retrieve a file from a storage system without
revealing the identity of the file in question to the storage servers. The original problem was introduced in [1], [2], and more
recently the problem setting was extended to the case where the files are stored on the servers in an encoded form rather than
merely being replicated [3]–[5]. The capacity of PIR for replicated storage was derived in [6] and for coded storage in [7]. For
the case of colluding servers, i.e., servers that cooperate to determine the index of the requested file, the capacity was derived
in [8] and for colluding and byzantine servers in [9]. In [10], [11] the respective capacities of symmetric PIR were derived.
In [12], a so-called star product PIR scheme was introduced. The scheme works with any linear code as a storage code and
retrieval code, and achieves the highest rate when both codes are generalized Reed-Solomon codes.
Currently, Netflix and Youtube alone are occupying more than 50% of Internet downstream traffic. Motivated by this huge
increase in multi-media streaming, we will consider private streaming suitable for distributed systems sharing encoded streams.
In a wider context, this is related to the problem of private stream search (PSS), which has been considered, e.g., in [13]–[15],
typically using cryptographic assumptions, and allows the user to privately learn the contents of the servers. As in most works
on information-theoretic PIR, we assume the user knows these contents and is able to query each server for linear combinations
of files. In this paper, we require information-theoretic privacy, namely that the servers gain zero information on the index of
the file being requested for streaming, based on the query received from the user.
Since convolutional codes are suitable for streaming and the star product scheme is efficient and flexible for PIR [16], [17],
we will design a scheme that makes use of both of these approaches. By the use of convolutional codes, the presented scheme
is related to PIR from databases encoded with non-MDS codes, for which constructions that achieve the MDS PIR capacity
without collusion [7] exist [18], [19].
Convolutional codes are sensitive to burst errors but good at handling well-distributed errors. As burst errors are unlikely
on, e.g., an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, they exhibit good performance compared to block codes on such
channels and have a lower bit error rate than comparable block codes with the same rate. See [20, Section V] for more details.
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
• To the best of the authors’ knowledge, information-theoretically private streaming is considered for the first time.
• Memory is introduced into the star product PIR scheme by a block convolutional structure, improving the performance
of the decoder for a large class of channels.
• Two schemes for different channels, namely a block erasure channel and a non-bursty channel, e.g., an AWGN channel,
are given. Both can operate on the same database and the user can adapt the queries according to the current channel
conditions.
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2• The achieved PIR rates are derived and for the block erasure scheme shown to be asymptotically optimal for the considered
model. For the Byzantine server model, the introduced scheme is shown to outperform the trivial scheme of downloading
stripes of the desired file separately without memory.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce block convolutional codes and the star product PIR
scheme of [12]. In Section III, we describe the combination of block convolutional codes with the star product PIR scheme and
show that the achievable asymptotic (in the number of stripes and files) PIR rate is equal to the conjectured PIR capacity of a
coded scheme with t-collusion. In Section IV, the scheme is adapted for a block erasure channel in which the user does not
receive replies in a given number of consecutive iterations of the protocol. In Section V, we introduce a scheme for non-bursty
channels based on the decoding algorithm of [20].
II. PRELIMINARIES
We denote by [a, b] the set of integers {i | a ≤ i ≤ b} and [b] = [1, b]. If c and d are vectors of the same length n, we
define their star product as the coordinate-wise product
c ⋆ d = (c1d1, . . . , cndn) .
Further, if C and D are linear codes of the same length, we define their star product to be the linear code
C ⋆D = 〈c ⋆ d | c ∈ C, d ∈ D〉 .
Throughout the paper, F will denote an arbitrary finite field.
A. Convolutional Codes
Definition 1 (Convolutional code). Let G1, . . . , GM+1 ∈ F
k×n and rank(G1) = k. Define an (n, k) convolutional code Cc as
Yi =
M+1∑
j=1
Xi−j+1Gj , (1)
where X0, . . . , X−M+1 = 0 and Xj ∈ F
k.
We refer to M as the memory of Cc, and if M = 1, we say that Cc is a unit memory (UM) code. In this paper, we consider
terminated convolutional codes, i.e., Y is not a semi-infinite vector, but Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yℓ+M ) where Yi is defined as in (1).
An (n, k)-code denotes a linear block code of length n and dimension k. A generalized Reed–Solomon (GRS) codeRS(n, k, v)
is an (n, k)-code with minimum distance d = n− k + 1 and generator matrix
G =


1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αn
...
...
. . .
...
αk−11 α
k−1
2 · · · α
k−1
n




v1 0 · · · 0
0 v2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · vn

 ,
where α1, . . . αn ∈ F are distinct evaluation points and the vj’s are all non-zero. If the choice of the vj’s is not important, we
sometimes write RS(n, k) code.
The distance measure of interest for convolutional codes is the extended row distance drι , which determines the minimum
number of errors required for an error burst of ι blocks to occur. For UM codes this distance can be lower bounded by the
designed extended row distance
d¯rι = d1 + (ι− 1)dα + d2, ι ≥ 1, (2)
where d1, d2, and dα denote the distances of the codes generated by G1, G2, and [G
T
1 , G
T
2 ]
T respectively. In [20], a decoding
algorithm is given, which is guaranteed to be successful if the number of errors does not exceed half the designed extended
row distance for any ι, i.e., it decodes successfully if
ι+s∑
j=s
wH(wj) <
d¯rι
2
, ∀ s ∈ [ℓ+M ], ι ∈ [0, ℓ+M − s], (3)
where wj denotes the error vector of the j-th block. We refer to an (n, k) UM code for which dα, d1 and d2 achieve the
Singleton bound for block codes as an optimal (n, k) UM code.
3B. Star Product PIR
We review the star product scheme for PIR from an arbitrary storage code, as introduced in [12]. Let C be an (n, k) code
(the storage code) with generator matrix G ∈ Fk×n, storing m files X1, . . . , Xm ∈ Fk. This means that each server j ∈ [n]
stores a column Yj of the matrix Y = XG ∈ F
m×n, where X ∈ Fm×k is a data matrix, whose i-th row X i represents the i-th
file. The scheme we will describe allows a user to retrieve the file X i without disclosing the index i.
Let D be a code of the same length n as C. Let D ∈ Fm×n be a matrix whose m rows are i.i.d. uniformly random codewords
of D. The query for the j-th server is given by
qij = D·,j + eiE1,j , (4)
where ei denotes the i-th standard basis vector and
1 E = E1,· ∈ F
1×n, where the · as index means that we consider all
columns.
The servers now respond with the standard inner product of their (m× 1) stored vector Yj and the query vector q
i
j which
they received, so the response of the j-th server is the symbol
rij =
〈
qij , Yj
〉
=
m∑
s=1
Ds,jY
s
j + E1,jY
i
j ∈ F. (5)
Considering the n responses obtained as a vector in F1×n, we can write it as
ri =
m∑
s=1
(Ds,1Y
s
1 , . . . , Ds,nY
s
n ) +
(
E1,1Y
i
1 , . . . , E1,nY
i
n
)
∈ C ⋆D + E ⋆ Y i.
Assuming E has weight wH(E) < dC⋆D , erasure decoding in C ⋆D now allows us to retrieve the vector E⋆Y
i, which depends
only on the desired file Y i. The rate achieved by this scheme is given by
R⋆PIR =
n− (k + t− 1)
n
, (6)
where t is the number of colluding servers, i.e., the maximal number of servers that can exchange their queries such that the
scheme is still private (see [12] for details). If the response is corrupted by channel erasures or a bounded number of malicious
servers, the user first decodes the response in C ⋆ (D + E), as in [17]. This is discussed further in Section V.
III. PIR FROM CONVOLUTIONAL CODES
In this section, it is shown how a large file can be streamed with asymptotically (with respect to the number of files) no
rate loss compared to the retrieval of stripes without memory, by designing, as per user’s request, the retrieved symbols such
that they are codewords of a convolutional code.
A. Storage Code
Denote bym the number of files Xs ∈ Fℓk, s ∈ [m], and by n the number of servers. The files are split into ℓ stripesXsi ∈ F
k
and encoded with an RS(n, k) storage code C with evaluation points αj , j ∈ [n]. The j-th server stores the j-th symbol of
every encoded stripe Y si ∈ F
n (see Figure 1).
B. Query
We query for a linear combination ofM+1 stripes in each block and design the queries such that the responses are codewords
of a convolutional code. Let D be an RS(n, t) code; the matrix D ∈ F(M+1)m×n as in (4); and J ⊂ [n] with |J | ≤ dC⋆D − 1.
The query for the j-th server is given by2
qij = D·,j + ezm+iEz+1,j , z ∈ [0,M ], (7)
where ei is the i-th standard basis vector and the matrix E ∈ F
M+1×n is given by
Ez+1,j =
{
αzkj , if j ∈ J
0 , otherwise
. (8)
C. Response
The protocol consists of ℓ +M iterations in each of which the servers respond with the inner product of the query and a
vector containing the stored symbols of M + 1 stripes of each file, depending on the iteration. In iteration ξ the response of
server j is given by
riξ,j =
〈
qij , (Yξ,j , Yξ−1,j , . . . , Yξ−M,j)
T
〉
, (9)
where Y−M+1 = · · · = Y0 = Yℓ+1 = · · · = Yℓ+M = 0 and Yξ = XξG denotes the matrix storing the ξ-th part of every file.
1This notation is chosen to be consistent with the later sections when E will be a matrix.
2Note that Ez+1,j is a scalar.
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Fig. 1: The queried symbols in iteration ξ and the query matrix, where Unif(D) denotes i.i.d. uniformly random codewords
from D. The j-th server responds with the inner product of the two vectors marked with ellipses.
D. Decoding
The response is given by
riξ =
M∑
z=0
m∑
s=1
Y sξ−z ⋆ Dzm+s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆D
+ Y iξ−z ⋆ Ez+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆Ez+1
. (10)
An illustration of the responses for UM codes is given in Figure 2.
Lemma 1. Let |J | ≥ k. Given the the responses {ri1, r
i
2, . . . , r
i
ℓ} the file X
i can be recovered.
Proof: By (8) the vectors Ez+1 are designed such that for any c ∈ C ⋆ Ez+1, z ∈ [0,M ] it holds that cj = 0, ∀ j /∈ J .
As |J | ≤ dC⋆D − 1 erasure decoding in C ⋆D recovers the vector
M∑
z=0
Ez+1 ⋆ Y
i
ξ−z =
M∑
z=0
X iξ−z ·GC⋆Ez+1
in each iteration, where the GC⋆Ez+1 are generator matrices of the storage code C with column multipliers Ez+1. Since |J | ≥ k,
each GC⋆Ez+1 is of rank k and it follows that given the set {X
i
ξ−M , . . . , X
i
ξ}\X
i
z, the stripe X
i
z can be determined uniquely. In
the first iteration X1−M = · · · = X0 = 0 so X1 can be recovered and recovery of the remaining stripes follows by induction.
As both C and D are GRS codes, the distance of the star product C ⋆ D is given by dC⋆D = n − (k + t − 1) + 1 and it
follows that at most dC⋆D − 1 = n− (k + t− 1) symbols can be downloaded in each iteration. As there are ℓ+M iterations
and the number of stripes in a file is ℓ, the PIR rate is given by
RPIR ≤
ℓ(n− (k + t− 1))
(ℓ +M)n
, (11)
which approaches the PIR rate of [12] given in (6) for ℓ → ∞. The highest PIR rate in this setting is achieved for |J | = k
and n = 2k+ t− 1. For the trivial case of memory M = 0 and t = 1 collusion the scheme is a repeated application of the star
product scheme [12] and therefore asymptotically achieves the capacity of PIR from MDS coded databases without collusion
[7] for m→∞.
IV. PROTECTING AGAINST BLOCK ERASURES
In the previous section, we showed how to design queries such that the symbols of the desired file recovered from the
responses are symbols of a code of higher dimension and memory M . While this setting asymptotically achieves the same PIR
rate as a comparable system that downloads blocks without memory, its advantages might not be obvious. In this section, we
utilize the construction to design a PIR scheme that is able to stream files consisting of many stripes in the presence of burst
block erasures, i.e., iterations where all the responses of the servers are lost. Since we are interested in streaming applications,
decoding should be possible without a big delay and without querying for more data or retransmission of blocks. Therefore,
we consider a sliding decoding window of N blocks and denote the maximum burst length of block erasures in a window
by ǫ. To protect against these erasures, more symbols of each block have to be retrieved privately in each iteration than in the
setting of the previous section.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the received symbols for M = 1.
Lemma 2. The number of symbols γ privately retrieved in each non-erased block has to satisfy
γ ≥
Nk
N − ǫ
.
Proof: Losing ǫ consecutive blocks out of N blocks leaves (N − ǫ) Nk
N−ǫ
= Nk retrieved symbols in that window, the
minimal number to recover the corresponding Nk message symbols.
Trivially M ≥ ǫ has to hold, since otherwise a burst of M +1 block erasures would make the received symbols independent
of some stripe of the file and recovery impossible.
A. Query
The queries are similar to Section III-B, but by Lemma 2 it has to hold that
|J | ≥
Nk
N − ǫ
. (12)
The set J has to be chosen such that recovery of the file is possible in the presence of block erasures.
Definition 2. Let G be the generator matrix of a convolutional code of memory M = ǫ and (n, k) component codes generated
by Gz , z ∈ [0,M ]. We say that a set J ⊂ [n] has the recovering property if
rank
(
G
∣∣R
J
)
= Nk
for any R = [ξ −N + ǫ+ 1, ξ]; ξ ∈ [ℓ+M ], where G
∣∣R
J
denotes the restriction of G to the positions in J in each block and
to the blocks indexed by R.
This assures that a burst of ǫ block erasures can be recovered while still being within the window of N blocks. In our
setting, the matrices Gz will be generator matrices of C ⋆ Ez+1. In the Appendix, we will show that when Gz generate a
Reed-Solomon code, then the recovering property is equivalent to a rather simple algebraic criterion. We also show that codes
with sets satisfying the recovering property exist.
B. Decoding
Decoding the queries to obtain the respective stripes of the requested file consists of two main steps: erasure decoding to
obtain the linear combination of desired symbols and recovering the stripes from these symbols.
Theorem 1. Let J be a set with the recovering property as in Definition 2, and let n ≥ k + t − 1 + |J |. For any set
R = [ξ −N + ǫ+ 1, . . . , ξ]; ξ ∈ [ℓ+M ]; the stripes {X iξ−N+1, . . . , X
i
ξ} can be recovered from the responses r
i
s, s ∈ R.
Proof: The code C ⋆D has distance dC⋆D = n− (k + t− 1) + 1 ≥ |J |+ 1, and it follows that the vector
M∑
z=0
Ez+1 ⋆ Y
i
ξ−z =
M∑
z=0
X iξ−z ·GC⋆Ez+1
can be recovered for any ξ ∈ R. By Definition 2, the matrix generating these vectors has rank Nk and thus all N stripes in
this window can be recovered.
6C. Performance
Lemma 3. The PIR rate is given by
RbPIR ≤
(
1−
ǫ
N
) ℓ(n− (k + t− 1))
(ℓ + ǫ)n
,
with equality for γ = Nk
N−ǫ
.
Proof: By definition, Nk information symbols have to be downloaded in each window of N blocks. In each round dC⋆D−1
symbols of the γ desired symbols can be downloaded. The PIR rate is hence given by
RPIR =
ℓ
ℓ+ ǫ
Nk
Nγ
d⋆−1
n
≤
ℓ
ℓ+ ǫ
k(n− (k + t− 1))
Nk
N−ǫ
n
=
(
1−
ǫ
N
) ℓ(n− (k + t− 1))
(ℓ + ǫ)n
.
Figure 3 gives a comparison of the rates of Lemma 3 and a trivial scheme based on the scheme of [12], that protects against
ǫ consecutive block erasures by downloading each block ǫ+1 times, resulting in a PIR rate of RPIR =
1
ǫ+1R
⋆
PIR. In Figure 3a
the number of consecutive erasures within a decoding window is fixed to ǫ = 3. For a window size of N = 4 the minimal
number of symbols to download in each iteration of the convolutional scheme is Nk
N−ǫ
= 4k and it follows that the PIR rates of
both schemes are the same, except for the rate loss due to termination. As the PIR rate of the trivial scheme does not depend
on the decoding window size, it remains constant. The PIR rate of the convolutional scheme approaches the PIR rate R⋆PIR,
i.e., the conjectured asymptotic PIR capacity of a coded scheme with t-collusion [12] for increasing decoding window size N
and number of stripes ℓ is
RbPIR =
(
1−
ǫ
N
) ℓ(n− (k + t− 1))
(ℓ + ǫ)n
ℓ→∞
N→∞−−−−→
n− (k + t− 1)
n
= R⋆PIR.
In Figure 3b, the ratio between the number of consecutive block erasures ǫ and the decoding window size N is fixed to
ǫ = 0.1N . For N = 2 the PIR rate of the trivial scheme and the convolutional scheme coincide, except for a rate loss due to
termination, as the single remaining block after ǫ = N2 = 1 block erasures allows only for a trivial scheme. For larger window
size, the PIR rate of the convolutional scheme decreases gradually as the number of consecutive block erasures and therefore
the required memory increases, while the PIR rate of the trivial scheme decreases with 1N
2
+1
. In Figure 3c, the decoding
window size is fixed to N = 12. For ǫ = 0 both schemes are the same, as a convolutional code with memory M = 0 results
in separate downloading of the stripes. For ǫ = 11 the difference between the PIR rates of the two schemes is solely due to
the rate loss caused by termination.
D. Examples
For ease of understanding, we give two examples of the described scheme for specific parameters. Example 1 shows that the
window size has to be chosen sufficiently large to allow for a non-trivial scheme and a gain in PIR rate. Example 2 describes
each step of the scheme in detail for specific parameters and gives a class of explicit locators for which the set J has the
recovering property from Definition 2.
Example 1. Consider the case where ǫ = 1 and N = 2. In this case Lemma 2 gives γ = 2k and the PIR rate for ℓ → ∞
is RPIR =
1
2R
⋆
PIR , where R
⋆
PIR is the rate achieved by the scheme in [12]. In this case, the same result can be achieved
with a trivial scheme that downloads each block twice.
Example 2. Let m = 3, M = 1, n = 6, k = 2, t = 1, N = 3 and ǫ = 1. Let D ∈ F6×6 be a random matrix with 6 i.i.d.
random codewords from an RS(n, t) code as rows and J = {4, 5, 6}. Assume the user wants to retrieve the second file X2.
With (8) the query matrix is given by
D +


0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 α24 α
2
5 α
2
6
0 0 0 0 0 0


∈ F6×6.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of PIR rates for n = 100, k = 75, t = 1 and ℓ = 100.
The query q2j for the j-th server is given by the j-th column.
In the first iteration the user obtains X21 . Now assume the second block is lost. In the third and fourth iteration the nodes
return r23,j =
〈
q2j , (Y3,j , Y2,j)
T
〉
and r24,j =
〈
q2j , (Y4,j , Y3,j)
T
〉
. The user receives
ri3 =
m∑
s=1
(Ds ⋆ Y
s
3 +DM+s ⋆ Y
s
2 ) + (0, 0, 0, Y
2
3,4 + α
2
4Y
2
2,4, Y
2
3,5 + α
2
5Y
2
2,5, Y
2
3,5 + α
2
6Y
2
2,6)
r4 =
m∑
s=1
(Ds ⋆ Y
2
4 +DM+s ⋆ Y
2
3 ) + (0, 0, 0, Y
2
4,4 + α
2
4Y
2
3,4, Y
2
4,5 + α
2
5Y
2
3,5, Y
2
4,5 + α
2
6Y
2
3,6)
8The distance of C ⋆D is dC⋆D = 4 and treating positions 4− 6 as erasures gives
(Y 23,(4:6) + α
2
4:6 ⋆ Y
2
2,(4:6), Y
2
4,(4:6) + α
2
4:6 ⋆ Y
2
3,(4:6)) = (X
2
2 , X
2
3 , X
2
4 ) ·

G
4:6
C⋆E2
G4:6C⋆E1 G
4:6
C⋆E2
G4:6C⋆E1


= (X22 , X
2
3 , X
2
4 ) ·


α24 α
2
5 α
2
6
α34 α
3
5 α
3
6
1 1 1 α24 α
2
5 α
2
6
α4 α5 α6 α
3
4 α
3
5 α
3
6
1 1 1
α4 α5 α6


, (13)
where α24:6 = (α
2
4, α
2
5, α
2
6). If this matrix has full rank, the files X
2
2 , X
2
3 and X
2
4 can be recovered. Whether it does have full
rank depends on the choice of evaluation points and we will now show that we can choose evaluation points such that this
matrix is invertible. Let us assume that the field size |F| > 3. Let α4, α5, α6 ∈ F be such that their squares α
2
j are all distinct.
Assume for a contradiction that the matrix
A =


α24 α
2
5 α
2
6
α34 α
3
5 α
3
6
1 1 1 α24 α
2
5 α
2
6
α4 α5 α6 α
3
4 α
3
4 α
3
6
1 1 1
α4 α5 α6


does not have full rank, but satisfies xA = 0 for some non-zero row vector x = [x1, . . . , x6]. Denoting
A′ =


α24 α
2
5 α
2
6
α34 α
3
5 α
3
6
1 1 1
α4 α5 α6


and studying the first and the last three columns of A separately, we get that
[x1, . . . , x4]A
′ = [x3, . . . , x6]A
′ = 0.
As A′ is a Vandermonde matrix, any three of its rows are independent, so x′A′ = 0 implies that x′ is either the zero vector or
has full support. As we know that x = [x1, . . . , x6] is not the zero vector, it follows that x1 is also non-zero, and after scaling
we may assume that x1 = 1. As A
′ has a one-dimensional left null space that contains both [x1, . . . , x4] and [x3, . . . , x6], we
must have [x3, . . . , x6] = t[x1, . . . , x4] for some t ∈ F. We can therefore write
[x1, x2, x3, x4] = [1, s, t, ts]
for some s, t ∈ Fq . The linear system of equations
[1, s, t, ts]


α24 α
2
5 α
2
6
α34 α
3
5 α
3
6
1 1 1
α4 α5 α6

 = 0
implies that
0 = α2j + sα
3
j + t+ tsαj = (α
2
j + t)(1 + sαj)
holds for j = 4, 5, 6. But since α2j were distinct for different j, at most one of the points may satisfy α
2
j + t = 0, and at most
one of them may satisfy 1 + sαj = 0. This is a contradiction and it follows that any set of locators with distinct squares has
the recovering property. By (11) the PIR rate for ℓ→∞ is given by
RbPIR =
2
3
·
6− 2
6
=
4
9
.
For these parameters, the PIR rate of the trivial scheme is given by
RPIR =
1
2
·
6− 2
6
=
2
6
< RbPIR.
9V. PIR WITH BYZANTINE SERVERS AND CONVOLUTIONAL CODES
In this section, we consider incorrectly received responses, due to either byzantine servers or errors during transmission.
We focus on constructions that result in a convolutional code of memory M = 1, i.e., UM codes. For these codes, the decoder
introduced in [20] can efficiently decode up to half the designed extended row distance, by a combination of bounded minimum
distance (BMD) decoding in the blocks and trellis-based decoding with the Viterbi algorithm. A key step in this algorithm
is decoding blocks in the cosets given by successfully decoded neighboring blocks. It is therefore imperative for a good
performance to design the code such that these cosets have good distance properties. In the following, we describe a scheme
that achieves this goal in the PIR setting.
A. Query
We query for two stripes in each block (i.e., unit memory M = 1) and design the queries such that when one block can be
decoded and both stripes can be recovered, the neighboring blocks have good distance properties in the corresponding cosets.
Let D ∈ F2m×n be as in (4) and D be an RS(n, t) code. The query for the j-th server is given by
qij = D·,j + eiE1 + em+iE2, (14)
where E1 = [a
−k
j ], E2 = [a
k+t−1
j ] and ei is the i-th standard basis vector.
B. Response
The response to one query consists of ℓ+ 1 parts. In iteration ξ the response of server j is given by
riξ,j =
〈
qij , [Yξ,j , Yξ−1,j ]
T
〉
, (15)
where Y0 = Yℓ+1 = 0 and Yξ = XξG denotes the matrix storing the ξ-th part of every file.
C. Decoding
The user receives
riξ =
m∑
s=1
(Ds ⋆ Y
s
ξ +Dm+s ⋆ Y
s
ξ−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆D
+E1 ⋆ Y
i
ξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆E1
+E2 ⋆ Y
i
ξ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆E2
+wξ,
where wξ denotes the error vector of iteration ξ.
Lemma 4. The codes C⋆(D+E1+E2), C⋆(D+E1), and C⋆(D+E2) have respective distances dC⋆(D+E1+E2) = n−3k−t+2
and dC⋆(D+E1) = dC⋆(D+E2) = n− 2k − t+ 2. The codes C ⋆D, C ⋆ E1 and C ⋆ E2 intersect trivially.
Proof: An RS(n, k, 1) code is the evaluation of all polynomials f(z) with deg(f(z)) ≤ k− 1 at the evaluation points αj .
Multiplying any polynomials corresponding to the codes C,D, E1 and E2 gives
fC(z) · (fD(z) + u
′
−kz
−k + u′k+t−1z
k+t−1) =
k+t−2∑
ι=0
uιz
ι
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆D
+
−1∑
ι=−k
uιz
ι
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆E1
+
2k+t−2∑
ι=k+t−1
uιz
ι
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C⋆E2
= z−k
3k+t−2∑
ι=0
uι−kz
ι,
where uι ∈ F. Evaluating this polynomial at αj , j ∈ [n], gives a codeword of C ⋆ (D+E1 +E2) = RS(n, 3k+ t− 1, [α
−k
j ]).
By the same argument, it holds that C ⋆ (D+E1) = RS(n, 2k+ t− 1, [α
−k
j ]) and C ⋆ (D+E2) = RS(n, 2k+ t− 1, 1). The
distances follow from the Singleton bound and the trivial intersection from the distinct powers in the polynomials.
To illustrate we give an example for explicit parameters.
Example 3. Let n = 10, k = 2 and t = 2. The defined matrices are given by:
GC = GD =
(
1 1 · · · 1 1
α1 α2 · · · α9 α10
)
,
E1 =
(
α−21 α
−2
2 · · · α
−2
9 α
−2
10
)
, E2 =
(
α31 α
3
2 · · · α
3
9 α
3
10
)
.
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GC⋆(D+E1+E2) =
α−21 α
−2
2 · · · α
−2
9 α
−2
10
α−11 α
−1
2 · · · α
−1
9 α
−1
10
1 1 · · · 1 1
α1 α2 · · · α9 α10
α21 α
2
2 · · · α
2
9 α
2
10
α31 α
3
2 · · · α
3
9 α
3
10
α41 α
4
2 · · · α
4
9 α
4
10




GC⋆(D+E1)
GC⋆(D+E2)
GC⋆E1
GC⋆D
GC⋆E2
The matrix GC⋆(D+E1+E2) is a generator matrix of an RS(10, 7, [α
−2
i ]) code. The matrices GC⋆(D+E1) and GC⋆(D+E2) are
generator matrices of an RS(10, 5, [α−2i ]) and RS(10, 5, [α
3
i ]) code respectively. Further, by the linear independence of the
rows of Vandermonde matrices, it can be seen that the codes C ⋆ E1, C ⋆ E2 and C ⋆D intersect trivially.
The large number of states makes trellis decoding of the convolutional code infeasible. In [20] an algorithm combining
BMD decoding in the blocks and Viterbi decoding on a reduced trellis is given, with decoding complexity only cubic in n, if
the complexity of the block decoders is quadratic in n. We give a brief description of this algorithm and show how it can be
applied to decode the responses.
1) Decode each received block in Cα = C ⋆ (D + E1 + E2), an RS(n, 3k + t− 1) code of distance dα = n− 3k − t+ 2.
2) From the blocks successfully decoded in step 1) decode lF steps forward and lB backward (see [20]) in the respective
coset C ⋆ (D +E1) or C ⋆ (D +E2). By Lemma 4 these are RS(n, 2k + t− 1) codes and can therefore be decoded up
to half their minimum distance d1 = d2 = n− 2k − t+ 2.
3) Build a reduced trellis and find the maximum-likelihood path with the Viterbi algorithm.
4) By Lemma 4, the codes C ⋆ D, C ⋆ E1 and C ⋆ E2 intersect trivially, and it follows that the parts of the file X
i can be
recovered uniquely from the codeword corresponding to the most likely path.
Theorem 2. If (3) holds, where d¯rι is given by (2) with dα = n− 3k− t+ 2 and d1 = d2 = n− 2k+ t+ 2, decoding of the
responses is successful and the file X i is decoded correctly.
Proof: By [20] the maximum likelihood path will be in the reduced trellis if (3) holds, which depends on the distance dα
in each block and the distances d1 and d2 in the corresponding cosets of the neighboring blocks. For the code given by the
responses {ri1, . . . , r
i
ℓ+1} these are shown in Lemma 4. If the path is contained in the trellis, the Viterbi decoder will find it,
as it is an ML decoder.
Corollary 1. The PIR rate of the scheme is
RPIR =
ℓk
(ℓ + 1)n
,
with n > 3k + t− 1 and it has error correction capability similar to an optimal (n− (k + t− 1), k) UM-code.
This result is similar to the scheme of [17] which also has error/erasure correction capability similar to an optimal (MDS)
block code of shorter length. This allows for a direct comparison, i.e., in any non-private setting where a block convolutional
code performs better than a comparable block code, our scheme will perform better when the privacy requirement is introduced.
D. Combination of Block Erasures and Byzantine servers
In this section we briefly discuss the combination of the two introduced schemes to a scheme that protects against both
considered error models, i.e., block erasures and Byzantine servers/channel errors. A direct combination is not possible as
the methods used to recover the symbols of the desired file are different (erasure decoding vs. trivially intersecting codes).
However, it is possible to give conditions under which the scheme for Byzantine servers also protects against single block
erasures, i.e., the case of M = ǫ = 1. By observing that the algorithm of [20] does not require termination, it is apparent
that if the condition for successful decoding (3) is fulfilled between any two erasures, the erased blocks can also be recovered
from the correctly decoded neighboring blocks. For a higher number of consecutive block erasures this is not possible, as the
decoding algorithm of [20] is designed only for unit memory codes, i.e., memory M = 1, and trivially ǫ ≤M has to hold. A
generalization of the algorithm seems possible, although the derivation of decoding guarantees might be difficult. Similar to
the algorithm for unit memory, it would consists of three main steps: decoding of each block separately, decoding of the M
preceeding and successive blocks in the corresponding cosets and trellis decoding. In the PIR setting, problems arise from the
second step, as it is not clear how to design the queries such that decoding one reply can be used to obtain higher distance
in both of the neighboring blocks. For the case of M = 1, as shown in Example 3, the codes C ⋆ E1 and C ⋆ E2 are given
by the lowest and highest powers, respectively, of the Vandermonde matrix that generates the code in each block. Therefore,
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decoding a block in one of the cosets gives another Reed-Solomon code and hence a large distance. For larger memory it
is unclear how to arrange these codes such that the former as well as the sequential blocks have good distance properties if
decoded in the respective cosets.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered information-theoretical private streaming by combining the star product PIR scheme [12]
with a block convolutional structure, thereby introducing the known benefits of codes with memory into the decoding of
privately streamed/downloaded data. We introduced two schemes for different channels, i.e., a block erasure channel and a
non-bursty channel (e.g., AWGN), that are suitable for streaming/downloading files, when the file size is larger than the packet
size communicated in each iteration. Both work on the same database and the user can adapt to changing channel conditions
by designing queries accordingly. The PIR rates of both schemes were derived and shown to improve upon a trivial scheme
based on separate retrieval of stripes.
Future work includes the combination of the two schemes and design of an additional outer code to improve the error-
correction performance.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF EXISTENCE
In this section, we explore the existence of locators with the recovering property of Definition 2, when the block matrices are
generator matrices of a Reed-Solomon code. First we formally define the matrix obtained by restricting the generator matrix
of a convolutional code to the N − ǫ non-erased blocks and |J | = γ code positions. We set ǫ = M , as this is the largest
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number of erased blocks that can be corrected by the convolutional code. In addition, we consider decoding windows of length
N = 2M + 1, which is clearly the shortest window that can allow for decoding the M = ǫ erased blocks. For simplicity, we
permute rows and columns to give the matrices Gi in ascending order in each block. Note that this does not change the rank
of the matrix.
Definition 3. Let Vi be the diagonal matrix with the entries [α
ik
j ]1≤j≤γ and
Gi =


1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αγ
...
...
. . .
...
αk−11 α
k−1
2 · · · α
k−1
γ

 · Vi−1 ∈ Fk×γ .
Define
A =


G1
G2 G1
...
...
. . .
GM+1 GM . . . G1
GM+1 . . . G2
. . .
...
GM+1


.
Now, {αj}j=1,...,γ has the recovering property if and only if A has rank Nk = (2M + 1)k. The rank of A can be related
to the dimension of intersections of different generalized Reed-Solomon codes.
Lemma 5. For A as in Definition 3 it holds that
rk(A) = (2M + 1)k ⇐⇒ 〈G1〉+
M∑
i=1
(〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G−M 〉)Vi is a direct sum.
Proof: Multiplying A from the right by a transformation matrix gives
A′ =


G1
G2 G1
...
...
...
GM+1 GM ... G1
GM+1 ... G2
...
...
GM+1

 ·


−V
−M
V
−M+1 −V−M+1
V
−M+2
...
... −V
−1
V0 V0

 =


−G
−M+1 0 ··· 0 0
0 −G
−M+2 0 0
...
...
...
0 0 ··· −G0 0
0 0 0 G1
G2 0 0 G2
0 G3 ··· 0 G3
...
...
...
0 0 0 GM
0 0 ··· GM+1 GM+1


.
The full rank of the transformation matrix follows from its upper diagonal structure, so rk(A) = rk(A′). Now rk(A′) <
(2M + 1)k if and only if there exists an x such that x ·A′ = 0.
The last γ columns of the equation xA′ = 0 now reads
0 = y1G1 + y2G2 + · · ·+ yM+1GM+1, (16)
where yi = x(M+i−1)k+1:(M+i)k . The first Mγ columns show that yiGi ∈ 〈Gi−M−1〉 for i ≥ 2, so writing ci = yiGi we get a
nontrivial solution to the equation 0 = c1+c2+ · · ·+cM+1, where c1 ∈ 〈G1〉 and ci ∈ 〈Gi〉∩〈Gi−M−1〉 = (〈G1〉∩〈G−M 〉)V
i
for i ≥ 2. It follows that if 〈G1〉 +
∑M
i=1(〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G−M 〉)Vi is not a direct sum, there is a linear combination of vectors
from the respective subspaces such that (16) is fulfilled and therefore a vector x with x · A′ = 0 exists. If it is a direct sum,
the only solution of (16) is y1 = y2 = · · · = yM+1 = 0 and therefore x = 0.
We now give an explicit method to choose locators with the recovering property for arbitraryM = ǫ and k, whereN = 2M+1
and 2M+1
M+1 k ≤ γ ≤ N − k. In particular, we show that a field with such locators always exists.
Lemma 6. Let {αj}j∈[γ] ⊆ F be a set of locators with ord(αj)|Mk+ γ for all j ∈ [γ]. Then for A as in Definition 3 it holds
that rk(A) = Nk if and only if the set
{(αik−j1 , . . . , α
ik−j
γ ) : 2 ≤ i ≤M + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − γ} ∪ {(α
j
1, . . . , α
j
γ) : 0 ≤ j < k}
is linearly independent.
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Proof: As the locators were chosen such that αMk+γj = 1, we get that Gi +Gi−M−1 is generated by the vectors
{(α
(i−1)k+j
1 , . . . , α
(i−1)k+j
γ ) : 0 ≤ j < k} ∪ {(α
(i−M−2)k+j
1 , . . . , α
(i−M−2)k+j
γ ) : 0 ≤ j < k}
={(α
(i−1)k+j
1 , . . . , α
(i−1)k+j
γ ) : 0 ≤ j < k} ∪ {(α
(i−2)k+j+γ
1 , . . . , α
(i−2)k+j+γ
γ ) : 0 ≤ j < k},
which is the set of evaluation vectors of γ consecutive powers, and thus an independent set of vectors. It follows that 〈Gi ∩
Gi−M−1〉 is generated by the intersection
{(α
(i−1)k+j
1 , . . . , α
(i−1)k+j
1 ) : 0 ≤ j < k} ∩ {(α
(i−2)k+j+γ
1 , . . . , α
(i−2)k+j+γ
γ ) : 0 ≤ j < k}
={(αik−j1 , . . . , α
ik−j
γ ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k − γ}. (17)
Observe that
{(αj1, . . . , α
j
γ) : 0 ≤ j < k}
are the rows of G1. Thus, by Lemma 5, we have rk(A) = Nk if and only if the sum
〈{(αj1, . . . , α
j
γ) : 0 ≤ j < k}〉+
M+1∑
i=2
〈{(αik−j1 , . . . , α
ik−j
γ ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k − γ}〉
is direct, or in other words if the union of their generating sets is linearly independent.
We are now ready to describe an explicit construction of regenerating sets, in the sense of Definition 3, over suitable fields.
Theorem 3. Let σ = α1 ∈ F be an element of order Mk+ γ, and let αi = σ
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ γ. Then rk(A) = Nk, where A is
as defined in Definition 3.
Proof: By Lemma 6, we need to show that the vectors
{(αik−j1 , . . . , α
ik−j
γ ) : 2 ≤ i ≤M + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k − γ} ∪ {(α
j
1, . . . , α
j
γ) : 0 ≤ j < k}
={(σik−j , . . . , σγ(ik−j)) : 2 ≤ i ≤M + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k − γ} ∪ {(σj , . . . , σγj) : 0 ≤ j < k}
are linearly independent. This set of vectors can also be written as{
(x, x2, . . . , xγ) : x ∈
{
σik−j : 2 ≤ i ≤M + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k − γ
}
∪
{
σj : 0 ≤ j < k
}}
,
and since σ was chosen so that σj takes different values for all 0 ≤ j < Mk + γ, these are indeed M(2k − γ) + k different
vectors of the form (x, x2, . . . , xγ). We know that any set of ≤ γ such vectors are independent, and since
M(2k − γ) + k = k(2M + 1)− γM ≤ k(2M + 1)
(
1−
M
M + 1
)
=
k(2M + 1)
M + 1
≤ γ,
the vectors are indeed linearly independent.
To apply Theorem 3 directly for an explicit construction, we need to work over a field Fq with elements of multiplicative
order Mk+γ, so Mk+γ|q− 1. In the case of unit memory, we have larger flexibility to choose the field size, in that we only
need γ|q − 1. Therefore, we will study the unit memory case next. However, we will see in Table 1 that random assignments
are very likely to yield regenerating sets even over fields without these assumptions.
Theorem 4. Let M = 1, γ = 32k be an integer and ord(αi)|γ ∀ i ∈ [γ]. Then for A as in Definition 3 it holds that
rk(A) = 3k.
Proof: By Lemma 5 it holds that rk(A) = 3k if 〈G1〉+ (〈G2〉 ∩ 〈G0〉) is a direct sum, which is equivalent to
dim(〈G0〉 ∩ 〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G2〉) = dim(〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G2〉 ∩ 〈G3〉) = 0.
The matrices G1 and G2 are given by
G1 =


1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αγ
...
...
. . .
...
αk−11 α
k−1
2 · · · α
k−1
γ


G2 =


αk1 α
k
2 · · · α
k
γ
...
...
. . .
...
αγ−11 α
γ−1
2 · · · α
γ−1
γ
αγ1 α
γ
2 · · · α
γ
γ
...
...
. . .
...
α2k−11 α
2k−1
2 · · · α
2k−1
γ


(a)
=


αk1 α
k
2 · · · α
k
γ
...
...
. . .
...
αγ−11 α
γ−1
2 · · · α
γ−1
γ
1 1 · · · 1
...
...
. . .
...
α
1
2
k−1
1 α
1
2
k−1
2 · · · α
1
2
k−1
γ


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TABLE I: Results of computer search for different parameters. The column Pfull gives the probability of the rank of A being
full obtained from checking 10000 random choices of locators from the respective field.
k M = ǫ N q Pfull
2 1 3 16 > 0.99
2 1 3 64 > 0.99
2 1 3 256 > 0.99
4 1 3 16 0.93
4 1 3 64 0.98
4 1 3 256 > 0.99
8 1 3 64 0.95
8 1 3 256 > 0.99
16 1 3 64 0.98
16 1 3 256 > 0.99
3 2 5 16 0.69
3 2 5 64 0.89
3 2 5 256 > 0.99
6 2 5 64 0.98
6 2 5 256 > 0.99
9 2 5 64 0.97
9 2 5 256 > 0.99
18 2 5 256 > 0.99
4 3 7 64 0.98
4 3 7 256 > 0.99
8 3 7 64 0.98
8 3 7 256 > 0.99
16 3 7 256 > 0.99
where (a) holds because ord(αi)|γ. As 〈G1〉 ∪ 〈G2〉 contains all rows of a γ × γ Vandermonde matrix it spans the entire
space Fγ and therefore dim(〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G2〉) ≤ 2k − γ. It follows that a complete basis of the intersection is given by
basis(〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G2〉) =


1 1 · · · 1
...
...
. . .
...
α
1
2
k−1
1 α
1
2
k−1
2 · · · α
1
2
k−1
γ

 .
By the same argument
basis(〈G2〉 ∩ 〈G3〉) =


α
1
2
k
1 α
1
2
k
2 · · · α
1
2
k
γ
...
...
. . .
...
αk−11 α
k−1
2 · · · α
k−1
γ


and by the linear independence of the rows of Vandermonde matrices it follows that
dim((〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G2〉) ∩ (〈G2〉 ∩ 〈G3〉)) = dim(〈G1〉 ∩ 〈G2〉 ∩ 〈G3〉) = 0.
With Theorem 4 we now have an explicit construction for the considered case by choosing the locators αi from a multiplicative
group of size γ. It remains to be shown that a field with a multiplicative group of that order exists.
Lemma 7. For any γ there exists a field Fq such that there is a choice of locators for which the matrix A as in Theorem 4
is of full rank.
Proof: By Theorem 4 the matrix A is always of full rank if the locators are chosen to be of order γ. A field Fq contains
a multiplicative group of order γ if γ|q − 1, where q is a power of a prime. By Dirichlet’s theorem [21] there are infinitely
many primes of the form p = l +mγ, if γ and l are coprime. For l = 1 any γ is coprime and it follows that for any γ there
are infinitely many primes p such that γ|p− 1.
For applications in data storage, the most interesting fields to consider are those of characteristic 2. Whether a field F2s for
which a construction as described in Theorem 4 is possible exists, depends on the existence of a Mersenne number Mp = 2
p−1
such that γ|Mp. As all Mersenne numbers are odd, so are all their divisors and it follows that the construction over a field F2s
is only feasible for odd γ, i.e., for 4 ∤ k.
For certain parameters Theorem 4 gives an explicit choice of locators such that the matrix A as defined in Definition 3 is of
full rank. In general it is an open problem whether matrices of such structure are of full rank, however as shown in Table I,
computer searches suggest that the probability is high for a random choice of locators from a sufficiently large field.
